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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The structural characteristics of employment are one of the main indicators of a country’s 
development in the long run. The share of industry, agriculture and services in global 
employment, occupational categories, education, human capital and distribution of skills are 
factors commonly taken as indicators of a country’s place on an evolutional ladder. It is 
common knowledge that high-income economies are characterised by high ratios of 
employment in the service sector. On the other hand, low-income economies are mainly 
agricultural. In the latter economies, economic development brings in an immediate increase 
in the share of manufacturing and services at the expense of agriculture. In the later phase of 
development, the share of industry stabilises, and then falls, while the service sector expands 
further (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987; Dohrn & Heilemann, 1993, 1996; EBRD 1997, 1999). 
Moreover, as Crafts (1996) says “…the reversal of deindustrialisation as per se good for 
growth and long-term economic welfare … would be a serious error”.  
In the context of economic transition (either in post communist countries or in ‘reformed’ 
communist countries like China), it has been  standard to link the process of development to 
the shifts in employment structures in terms of the public (old) and private (new) sectors. 
Aghion and Blanchard (1993), Roland (1994), Rodrik (1995), Ruggerone (1996), Driffill 
and Miller (1998) and Yin (2001) provide a detailed discussion of economic transition in 
terms of the structural shift from the state to the private sector, with the possible emergence 
of unemployment as a side effect. In those models, the efficiency of market reforms is 
measured by the size of the private (new) sector. It is suggested that if the market reforms 
are not consistently implemented, then the private (new) sector cannot grow quickly enough 
to absorb excess labour coming from the shrinking state sector. Moreover, the resultant 
unemployment has negative indirect fiscal effects on employment creation in the private 
(new) sector. Consequently, the steady state equilibrium may be sub-optimal.  
Building on Rowthorn and Wells (1987), the paper explains the process of 
deindustrialisation experienced by post-communist countries. In this way, we bring together 
the literature developed for industrialised economies with the work published on post-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
 
communist transition. As far as we are aware, this is a first analysis of post-communist 
transition from a perspective of the changes in employment structures among three economic 
sectors: industry, agriculture and services. We show that deep deindustrialiation results from 
the inconsistent market reforms implementation and is not optimal for long run economic 
development. This result is consistent with the argument presented by Crafts (1996) who 
analyses the sources and the large scale of the UK deindustrialisation as compared with 
West Germany and Japan. We also demonstrate that reforms of the agriculture sector play a 
significant role in placing a transition country on a development path, which guarantees 
convergence to the EU employment structures. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The structural characteristics of employment are one of the main indicators of a country’s 
development in the long run. The share of industry, agriculture and services in global 
employment, occupational categories, education, human capital and distribution of skills are 
factors commonly taken as indicators of a country’s place on an evolutional ladder. In 
addition, in the context of economic transition (either in post communist countries or in 
‘reformed’ communist countries like China), it has been standard to link the process of 
development to the shifts in employment structures in terms of the public (old) and private 
(new) sectors. Aghion and Blanchard (1993)
1, Roland (1994), Rodrik (1995), Ruggerone 
(1996), Driffill and Miller (1998) and Yin (2001) provide a detailed discussion of economic 
transition in terms of the structural shift from the state to the private sector, with the possible 
emergence of unemployment as a side effect. In those models, the efficiency of market 
reforms is measured by the size of the private (new) sector. It is suggested that if the market 
reforms are not consistently implemented, then the private (new) sector cannot grow quickly 
enough to absorb excess labour coming from the shrinking state sector. Moreover, the 
resultant unemployment has negative indirect fiscal effects on employment creation in the 
private (new) sector. Consequently, the steady state equilibrium may be sub-optimal.  
Although the above mentioned (theoretical) models provide important terms of reference for 
any discussion of the outcome of economic transition, at least three issues need further 
consideration: 
-  The equilibrium outcome.  All the theoretical models developed so far cause 
problems for empirical testing since they focus on modelling the dynamics of transition 
time-paths. The analysis of changes in the economic variables during the transition 
period brings two problems. First, the concept of transition advancement is difficult to 
measure and second, the data points are very limited. Hence, we propose to look at the 
‘after-reform’ characteristics instead of modelling transition time-paths. 
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-  The explanatory power of unemployment. It has become customary to associate 
the unemployment rate with the progress of economic transition. The problem is that 
while the theoretical results are consistent with intuition, they find rather weak support in 
empirical work. Even where the unemployment rates differed between countries at the 
beginning of the transition period, the dissimilarity seems to fade over time (Andreff 
(1999) shows that unemployment rates have become similar among transition 
economies). In other words, the rate of unemployment cannot be taken as a major 
factor explaining differences in transition outcomes in the long-run. 
-  Sectoral adjustment. The choice of the ‘state versus private sector’ dichotomy as a 
major structural characteristic may be insufficient to explain transition adjustments. The 
primary problem is that the size of the private sector is seen as a one-dimensional 
endogenous outcome of other policy variables, macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 
However, the speed of privatisation has always been a direct policy decision. 
Moreover, it was not a one-dimensional choice. Variety in privatisation methods has led 
to different outcomes in terms of productivity and the dynamics of output. Thus, we 
argue that it is both more accurate and empirically sound to look at economic transition 
as a shift from the old to the new industrial structure of output, rather than a transfer 
from the state to the private sector. 
To address the above issues, we analyse the long-term structures of employment emerging 
from the implementation of market reforms. We divide each economy into industry, 
agriculture and services. We also shift the focus from unemployment to activity rates, 
considering unemployment and the economically passive population jointly. As far as we are 
aware, the theoretical models focused on the employment shares among agriculture, industry 
and services has not been applied in the context of the post-communist transition.
2 
However, such studies are well documented in the more general case of developed and 
developing countries. It is common knowledge that high-income economies are 
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characterised by high ratios of employment in the service sector. On the other hand, low-
income economies are mainly agricultural. In the latter economies, economic development 
brings in an immediate increase in the share of manufacturing and services at the expense of 
agriculture. In the later phase of development, the share of industry stabilises, and then falls, 
while the service sector expands further (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987; Dohrn & Heilemann, 
1993, 1996; EBRD 1997, 1999). Moreover, as Crafts (1996) says “…the reversal of 
deindustrialisation as per se good for growth and long-term economic welfare … would be 
a serious error”. 
Our theoretical analysis adopts the Rowthorn-Wells (1987) model as a starting point. The 
Rowthorn-Wells model was developed as a response to the decline of industry share 
experienced by developed, western economies in the 1970s and 1980s. The model 
contributed to the extensive debate on the role and optimal speed of deindustrialisation of 
western economies. The debate continues now including the post-communist countries. 
Rowthorn and Wells argue that long-term structural change is driven by two factors: 
-  improvement in productivity at different rates across sectors (lowest for services),  
-  differences in income elasticities of demand (with the demand for food being 
income-inelastic). 
These two factors are sufficient to explain the long-term dynamic structural evolution.  It first 
results in the phase of industrialisation (both, the shares of industry and services in 
employment growing at cost of agriculture) and then in the phase of deindustrialisation 
(service sector employment growing at the expense of industry).
3 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
transition introduces three sectors: an old state sector and two new sectors (traded and non-traded 
goods), under an assumption of full employment. 
3 One particular problem, which we ignore in our theoretical section, is that in the Rowthorn-Wells model 
aggregate value-added is an additive function of sectoral value-added. In a more general framework, we 
would have:  ) ,..., 2 , 1 ( n E E E f V = , where  V is value-added,  E  corresponds to the share of 
employment in a sector of economic activity and the function f may or may not be additive. In the latter William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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Thus, Rowthorn and Wells conclude that the underlying pace of productivity change in 
different sectors is the major driving force of structural change. More explicitly, it is not the 
case that some countries are poor due to an excessive share of employment in agriculture, 
but rather that this share is excessive due to low productivity in that sector. Obviously, the 
model implicitly assumes underlying market adjustment of wages and prices.  The underlying 
improvement in productivity leads to an increase in income per capita, which in turn affects 
the structure of demand and leads to the development of ‘new’ sectors, services in 
particular. Due to the fact that many services are non-tradable, the structure of production 
follows domestic demand. Lower productivity in the service sector implies that the share of 
services increases more than proportionately with an increase in the real income. Therefore, 
the link between sectoral employment structures and GDP per capita results from a mixture 
of demand and supply factors. Capital accumulatio n, enhancement in human capital, 
infrastructure, and legal and macroeconomic stability all contribute to increased productivity 
in agriculture, and next in industry. Reallocation of employment to services 
(deindustrialisation) represents a mixture of a shift towards more efficient production 
structures and a response to the shifting pattern of demand. 
 
We place the post-communist transition in the broader context of this long-term model 
taking into account the stylised facts.  
First, the communist countries have been characterised by an exceptionally high share of 
industry compared with the other middle -income economies.
4 Therefore, one should not 
anticipate a further increase of industry share in total employment to be a prevailing feature 
of post-communist adjustment. On the contrary, an intensive process of deindustrialisation is 
to be expected. 
Second, while economic reforms (which came as a consequence of the “regime switch”) 
resulted in an immediate decrease of industry share, the growth of the service sector was not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
case there are complementarities between sectors. For instance, the efficiency of manufacturing may be 
enhanced by the existence of a developed financial sector, other business-oriented services, transport 
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the common situation. In this respect, the post-Soviet block was very heterogeneous. There 
were countries (like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), which seemed to be 
restructuring their economies successfully. Their case was characterised by a decrease of 
industry employment share and rapid development of services. At the same time countries 
like Ukraine or Romania experienced an increase in an agricultural share as a consequence 
of a decrease in employment in the industry sectors and sluggish growth of their service 
sectors. These countries are also classified as less successful in terms of reforms and 
economic growth. This divergence in the transition paths brings to life the issue of whether 
the structural change associated with transition can be explained by the existing theory. 
 
We demonstrate in our theoretical analysis of structural employment adjustments that the 
deindustrialisation model developed by Rowthorn and Wells for developed countries can be 
successfully applied to explain the contraction of the industry sector experienced by post-
communist countries during transition. Moreover, as a result of insufficient reforms, different 
paths of adjustment can be distinguished. In particular, we explain the further expansion of 
employment in agriculture, observed in countries classified as “less successful” in the reforms 
implementation. We argue that reforms of the agricultural sector, so often undermined by 
policymakers, play a crucial role in placing a country on a development path. Our theoretical 
approach is confirmed in empirical analysis. Using EBRD transition indicators and 
restructuring indexes defined by Jackman and Pauna (1997) we document a strong linkage 
between the employment structures and the efficiency of reforms. We show that the level of 
employment in the industrial sector alone does not indicate successful reforms. To assess the 
restructuring efforts one must inspect the level of employment in agriculture (low) and 
services (high) and control for the initial endowment in human and physical capital.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 opens with a model of the long-term 
relationship between economic development and the structure of employment, and defines 
the various patterns of structural adjustment during the post-communist transition. It is 
shown that the post-communist liberalisation can be interpreted in terms of switching onto 
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the ‘normal’ (market determined) path of development but alternative outcomes result from 
inadequate reforms. Section 3 provides empirical evidence on employment structures in 
(post-) transition economies and specific countries of the EU. Using simple regression 
analysis Section 4 documents the link between the efficiency of reforms and the structure of 
employment. In addition, it provides insight into the significance of various elements of 
reforms for structural outcomes. The results show consistency between the empirical data 
and the theoretical model presented in Section 2. Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
2.1. LONG-TERM FRAMEWORK: THE ROWTHORN-WELLS MODEL 
Based on Rowthorn and Wells’ work (1987) we define labour productivities in agriculture, 
industry and services as exogenous variables 
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0 = ,      (1) 
where subscripts a, i and s relate to agriculture, industry and services respectively. The level 
of productivity at the beginning of the development path is denoted by y0 (>0). Parameter k 
(>0) refers to accumulated human and physical capital, and the l(>0) parameters to the 
differences in productivities among sectors.
5  
Aggregate employment is given by: 
L = fN,                                                                         (2) 
where, N represents population and f is the employment rate interpreted as a percentage of 
the total population (not of the working age population). This means that  1 0 < < f . 
                                                                   
5 Rowthorn and Wells (1987) provide extensive empirical evidence showing that, in the case of 
developed countries, productivities of agriculture and industry sectors are considerably higher than 
productivity of the service sector. 
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Output in agriculture is proportional to the size of the population. This simplification reflects 
the fact that the income elasticity for food is low.  Therefore, agricultural output and 
employment are correspondingly given by: 
            Za = g N,            (3a) 
La = Za / ya,          (3b) 
where,  g  is a coefficient of demand. Therefore: 0 < g < y0 / f.  
Employment and output in services are determined by a second demand condition, which 
implies that the real output of services (Zs, equivalent to real demand) is a constant fraction 
of total output, that is  Zs  = cZ. This puts a restriction on the corresponding demand 
coefficient: 0 < c < 1. More formally, employment and output in services can be expressed 
correspondingly as: 
s i s
i a i a a
s cy cy y
y L Ly y L c
L
- +
- +
=
) (
,                              (4a) 
Zs = Ls ys.            (4b) 
Finally, employment and output in industry will be determined according to the equations: 
Li = L – La – Ls,              (5a) 
Zi = Li yi.                (5b) 
It follows directly from the model specification that aggregate output Z is 
( ) ( ) ( )
k
a
k k
s i s a s i a
i i s e L L e e L N y Z Z Z k c f Z
l l l g g l l l - + - + = + + = 0 ) , , , , , , ( .      (6) 
Without loss of generality, we can make several assumptions which significantly simplify the 
calculations. First, we can standardise y0 as equal to 1. Moreover, we can normalise labour 
productivity equations by putting  1 = s l . Thus equation 1 transforms to  
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where, given footnote 5, both  a l and  i l are now greater than 1, and equation 6 becomes 
( ) ( )
k
a
k k
s i s a i a
i i e L L e e L N Z Z Z k c f Z
l l g g l l - + - + = + + = ) , , , , , ( .               (6’) 
 
2.2.  THE COMMUNIST PAST AND THE POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION 
The overindustrialisation of the Soviet block is a reflection of the preferences of central 
planners who transferred resources from the other economic sectors in order to develop the 
sector that they believed to be both the engine of economic growth and essential for military 
build-up. The low preference for agriculture may be explained by the fact that the communist 
policymakers could achieve low standards of consumption; first, via political terror (the most 
dramatic example of suppressed consumption is the great Soviet famine during the 1930s) 
and second, in the latter period, via compressed income structures which resulted in 
significant numbers being pushed above the poverty level. Similarly, the low share of 
services i n consumption also arose from the compressed income distribution, since a high 
share of services was taken as an indication of a ‘luxury goods’ sector.  
The employment rates were high in all communist countries and work was presented not 
only as a right, but also as an obligation. These high employment rates additionally supported 
overindustrialisation. 
The collapse of communism revealed authentic preference structures and resulted in a shift 
of demand. This in turn induced significant changes in the reallocation of resources. The 
process of adjustment to market oriented preferences started as soon as the central plan 
was dismantled, prices were liberalised and market reforms were introduced. As a result, 
demand for goods became more consistent with the preferences of society. More 
specifically, this adjustment to ‘market’ preferences manifest itself in an increase in demand 
for agriculture and service products, represented by g and c, respectively. At the same time 
a downward shift in the employment rate f occurred. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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Changes also occurred on the supply side. However, we do not attribute them to changes in 
humans and physical capital accumulation k. Although, in the long run, capital accumulation 
k should increase, strong empirical evidence by Berg et al.  (1999), Havrylyshyn et al. 
(1998) and Christoffersen and Doyle (1998) shows that capital accumulation cannot be 
considered a significant factor affecting production outcomes during transition in the 1990s. 
Based on this evidence, we treat capital accumulation  k as a constant exogenous variable 
that has no influence on transition outcomes. 
 
However, we take into account that sector productivity differentials ls might change during 
transition. Moreover, the changes in the differentials should be strongly associated with the 
quality and consistency of implemented market reforms. If a government successfully 
restructured both the industry and the agriculture sectors, then the dominant position of these 
sectors, in the sense of higher productivity, over the service sector would sustain. However, 
the policymakers might not put enough effort towards modernising those two sectors. It 
might happen, that either land reforms or manufacturing restructuring were implemented 
erratically. In this case, the productivity of the ‘neglected’ sector would be significantly lower 
than the productivity of the restructured one. 
To make the above scenarios tractable within the Rowthorn-Wells framework, we slightly 
simplify the story (and the notation) and assume that the post-transition sectoral differentials 
la,  li,  will have values either equal to one or l, which is always greater than one. In 
contrast, ls is always equal to one.
6 More precisely, we consider the following situations: 
-  Case 1: if agriculture and industry retain their productivity advantage as compared 
with services, then they have equal productivities denoted by l > 1, i.e. la=li = l 
and ls=1; this case corresponds to successful industrial and agricultural reforms. 
-  Case 2: if industry alone remains a leading sector, then  li=l, and  la=ls=1; we 
have successful industrial reforms and failed agricultural reforms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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-  Case 3: if agriculture alone is a leading sector, then  la=l, and  li=ls=1; i.e., 
agricultural reforms are successful and industrial reforms fail. 
and in the least optimistic case,  
-  Case 4: when both productivities of agriculture and industry drop down, then 
la=li=ls=1. 
The above cases have different implications for the development of the economy as a whole.
 
It is easy to calculate that total outputs (denoted by Zn for case n, where n = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
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It immediately follows that Z1 > Z 2, Z3 > Z4 and Z1 > Z4 for any combination of parameters 
f, c, g and k that is independent of the basic demand shift. However, Z1 > Z3 when 
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These inequalities (11 and 12) are satisfied for high values of the indicator of accumulated 
human and physical capital k and employment rate f. This can be assumed in the case of the 
post-communist countries.
7 Moreover, if inequality 12 holds, then inequality 11 follows 
immediately, and we have Z1 > Z 2 >Z3 > Z 4. If inequality 12 does not hold, then a weaker 
condition determines the mutual position of Z2 and Z4. Namely, if   
f e
c
k <
-
-
1
1
g ,                                                        (13) 
then  Z2 > Z 4.  Hence, we can conclude that case 4 is least optimal and leads to the lowest 
level of GDP (smallest Z), and that case 1 achieves the highest level of total output. 
As already discussed, overindustrialisation was a common disease of the communist 
countrie s and so market reforms brought an unavoidable reduction in the share of industry in 
employment. If reforms were conducted successfully, then the transfer of the labour force 
from industry to services should have occurred. However, in the cases 1-4 above the impact 
of reforms on the development of the service sector is different. To illustrate this we use the 
joint share of agriculture and services (i.e., one minus share of industry), instead of the total 
share of industry as a base for our calculations.
8 We define  
L
L L
L
L n s n a n i
n
, , , 1
+
= - = j , 
where n  = 1, 2, 3, 4, depending on which case is discussed. The results of our calculations 
are presented in Table 1. 
                                                                   
7 It is interesting to note that Z2 > Z3 can hold even for low values of  k, providing preferences for 
agriculture and services sectors are sufficiently low (low values of g and c) and the employment rate f is 
high (as it was during communist). 
8 This provides a significant simplification in calculation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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TABLE 1 
POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT 
Case n 
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It is clear that the share of agriculture in total employment is lowest when reforms of this 
sector are successful, i.e., they do not lead to a decrease in the agriculture sector’s relative 
productivity (case 1 and 3). On the other hand, if agriculture is not properly restructured, the 
sector’s employment rate is higher in comparison to the successful restructuring scenario. 
Changes in demand for agricultural products do not affect the steady state outcome.  
The case of the employment share of services is more complex. Here, it is obvious that the 
case of least consistent reforms (i.e., case 4) leads to the lowest share of employment in the 
service sector. Moreover, successful reforms of both industry and agriculture (case 1) lead 
to a higher proportion of employment in services than when only the industrial sector is 
successfully restructured (case 2). A comparison of cases 1 and 3 also favours the former, 
providing we assume that inequality 11 holds, which, as argued above, should be expected. 
In summary, consistent reforms of agriculture and industry lead to the highest share of the 
service sector in total employment. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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Based on the above analysis we conclude that the share of industrial employment is lower in 
case 2 than in case 1. Similarly, case 4 has a lower Li/L ratio than case 3. Moreover, if 
inequality 13 holds, then the share of industrial employment in case 2 is lower than in case 4. 
If inequality 11 holds, then the proportion of workers employed in industry is higher in case 
3 than in case 1. This means that a large decrease in industrial employment is not an 
indicator of successful reforms: the superiority of case 1 over case 2 is evident, even though 
the share of industry in employment is lower in the latter case.
9 
In summary, we can say that when a country has a relatively high level of human and 
physical capital (as the post-communist countries do, since they are middle-income 
economies in terms of GDP per capita), it is critical that consistent reforms are introduced in 
both industry and agriculture. Concentrating on restructuring just the industry sector is not 
sufficient to create a proper base for long-term economic development when measured by 
the level of GDP and the structural shift of the labour force from industry to services.
10 
3. SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT IN PRACTICE 
3.1   THE COMMUNIST PAST 
As already discussed, the share of industry in total employment was much higher in all 
countries of the Soviet block than comparator countries with a similar level of income per 
                                                                   
9 These theoretical results are consistent with Crafts’ (1996) analysis of the causes and the scale of the 
UK deindustrialisation as compared with West Germany and Japan.  Crafts gives evidence for low 
productivity growth (even negative figures for the 1970s) and the deep decline of the industrial labour 
force (42% in 1973 against 29.4% in 1989) in the UK. He argues that  “better design of macroeconomic 
and labour market policies could and should have made it (deindustrialisation) less painful”. 
10 The analysis of structural characteristics of the models (i.e. their comparative sensitivity to changes in 
demand for agriculture and service products, and employment rate) is not reported as it is outside the 
scope of this paper, however the authors can provided computations on request. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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capita.
11 This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
12 
 
Figure 1. GDP per capita and share of industry, 1990, 71 countries  
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Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook 1995, New York 1997 and WIIW database. 
 
The countries with a value of standardised residuals higher than 1.5 times standard deviation 
are (in order of magnitude): Romania, Morocco (position not indicated on the graph), 
Ukraine, Poland, Russia and Hungary. Except Morocco, these are all post-communist 
countries. Other members of the former Soviet block incorporated in the UN data set are 
also above the regression curve, including Estonia and three former Soviet Union republics: 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan. The large share of industry is obviously an explicit effect 
of the imposed pattern of development under communism (EBRD, 1997, p.64). 
The high employment in industry in comparison to employment in services is even more 
striking when we restrict ourselves to a purely structural plan, plotting both industry and 
services as percentage points (Figure 2). Again, out of six outliers with a positive sign (i.e., 
standardised residual higher than 1.5), five were post-communist countries (at the time that 
                                                                   
11 The difference in the employment shares of industry between the Soviet block and the rest of world 
would be even more striking with non-employment added as a fourth sector since employment rates 
were exceptionally high in the socialist countries (represented by coefficient f in the theoretical model). 
12 The trend line depicted on the graph includes former communist economies. When the socialist 
countries are excluded from the sample, the coefficient of determination increases from 0.15 to 0.29. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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reforms started).
13 It is clear that the relationship between income per capita and the size of 
the industrial sector in (post-)Soviet countries does not fit into the standard pattern in the 
pre-transition period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Employment structures, 1990, 71 countries. 
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Note: Agriculture (=100%-industry-services) corresponds to either ISIC2, division 1 or ISIC3, 
categories A and B; industry means either ISIC2, divisions 2-5, or ISIC3, categories C-F, while 
services relate to remaining sections  
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook 1995. 
However one could argue that the observed anomaly of the communist countries is the result 
of more general factors, which are not included in the simple picture presented in Figures 1 
and 2. Rowthorn and Wells (1987) stress that the phase of the business cycle (as, say, 
measured by unemployment indicators), and export specialisation are crucial factors 
                                                                   
13 As indicated, in order of magnitude: Romania, Morocco, Ukraine, Poland, Russia, and Hungary. 
Negative outliers, on the other end of the spectrum (standardized residuals lower than –1.5) were: 
Myanmar, Panama, Thailand and Indonesia. Similarly for Figure 2, when the socialist countries are 
excluded, the coefficient of determination for the trend line increases from 0.24 to 0.42.In general, the 
coefficients are higher than those from Figure 1, because employment in services and industry is always 
negatively correlated (as the shares of both sectors plus agriculture must add to one). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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affecting the pattern of deindustralisation in high-income countries. Dohrn and Heilemann 
(1996) argue that the inclusion of investment, natural resource endowment variables, and the 
exclusion of low-income countries (for which dispersion around the trend is large), are 
necessary prerequisites of the analysis. 
To discuss these factors in the context of post-communist countries, we should first note that 
natural resource endowment is correlated with the share of the primary sector in exports. 
This limits the debate to four, rather than five, possible factors. Moreover, the exclusion of 
low-income countries is problematic for the problem in hand as it affects the generality of 
analysis. The extension of the other arguments to the case of communist countries i s not 
straightforward either. Specialisation in exports cannot be responsible for 
overindustrialisation, because the share of exports in GDP was generally low for communist 
economies. These countries followed a strategy of semi-autarchic self-sufficiency. Also, the 
natural resource basis differed significantly within the region, being broad in the former 
Soviet Union and narrow in Central Europe, hence it cannot explain a common pattern of 
overindustrialisation.  
Investment is also a doubtful variable. While investment rates were typically exceptionally 
high in the early stages of communist development, the analysis of data shows that the 
empirical picture is more complex: 
-  the typical range of investment share of GDP was 24-38% for communist countries, yet 
several fast-growing non-communist countries were characterised by similar rates 
(especially the Far East); on the other hand, one of the most industrialised communist 
countries, East Germany had notably low rates of investment (Gregory, Stuart, 1995, 
Chapter 12),  
-  investment rates decreased significantly in the final stage of communism, in particular 
during the 1980s in Central Europe. Gomulka (1991) documents that most of those 
economies faced a dramatic shift in policy around 1980. Between 1978 and 1994, the 
level of investment in communist Central and Eastern Europe was cut by one third. The 
change was even more dramatic in Poland and Hungary; the former faced an almost William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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60% cut in investment and the latter a cut of nearly two thirds. At the same time there 
was no significant adjustment in employment in the industrial sectors.  
Thus, in line with Figures 1 and 2, we argue that overindustrialisation in the communist 
countries was not just the result of direct impact of capital accumulation, but also of the 
more fundamental choice of the model of development. The priority given to industry can be 
traced back to the ideological discussions, which accompanied the origins of the Soviet 
model in the 1920s. The model, which emerged in the Soviet Union and was subsequently 
copied in all countries under Russian domination, gave priority to industry over agriculture 
and services and – within industry itself – to heavy industry at the cost of consumer-oriented 
branches (Gregory, Stuart, 1995). Overindustrialisation was  a consequence of military 
aspirations and import–subsidisation strategy. In addition, a large part of industrial 
employment corresponded to labour hoarding, which was presumably greater than in 
services.
14 
 
3.2  THE POST-COMMUNIST PRESENT 
 
Figure 3 below presents the current structures of employment for the post-communist 
countries, which will be the core of our regression analysis (ten EU candidate countries, plus 
Croatia, Moldova and Russia).
15 A simple comparison with Figure 2 shows that the last ten 
years have brought significant changes in employment structures. In general, we can say that 
the employment share of services has increased for most of the countries in the group. This 
is reflected in a shift from the upper-left area of Figure 2 towards the upper-right part of 
Figure 3. However, this general trend does not apply to Romania and Moldova, which 
experienced a dramatic decrease in industrial employment (about 15%) without any 
                                                                   
14 As a result, the post-communist deindustrialisation process may have an additional direct effect on 
the employment rate, via the elimination of ‘labour hoarding’ (overstaff). The latter phenomenon is a 
major focus of Yin (2001). 
15 To plot Figure 3 we use International Labour Office data to be consistent with the data used for the 
regression analysis in Section 4. We used UN data for Figures 1 and 2 purely for illustrative purposes, 
as they allowed us to construct bigger comparator samples.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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‘compensating’ growth in the share of services (indicating growth of agricultural 
employment). These countries are also known for erratic and unsuccessful implementation of 
market reform. A more careful look at Figures 2 and 3 provides evidence of big shifts within 
the main cluster of countries, too. Economies like Hungary and Poland experienced 
relatively mild deindustrialisation (a decrease of 2 -5 percentage points) along with a 
significant growth of the service sector (above 10%). At the same time, changes of industrial 
and agricultural employment in Russia seem to offset each other. Again, Russia is a country 
commonly classified as relatively less consistent in implementation of market reform than the 
aforementioned countries of Central Europe. All this indicates that, while the structural 
characteristics of post-reform economies may depend on the initial level of a country’s 
development (as measured by levels of human and physical accumulated capital), they may 
also be a function of the efficiency and consistency of market reforms. 
 
Figure 3. Employment structures, 1999, 13 transition countries
Ru
Mo
Cr Bu
Li La
Es
SnSk
Ro
Pl Hu
CZ
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Services
Industry
 
Note: Agriculture (=100%-industry-services) corresponds to either ISIC2, division 1 or ISIC3, 
categories A and B; industry means either ISIC2, divisions 2-5, or ISIC3, categories C-F, while 
services relate to remaining sections 
 
Source: International Labour Office Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 2000. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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In the next section we present the results of regression analysis taking the model developed 
in Section 2 as a reference point. However, we should mention that it is difficult in practice 
to find an example of a post-communist country that has succeeded in agricultural reforms 
only (case 3).
16 Industry had such a dominant position before the collapse of communism 
that the main efforts were concentrated (if at all) on restructuring that sector. If these 
attempts failed then the reforms of the agricultural sector did not succeed either, typically 
because the institutional framework of property rights remained inadequate in both sectors 
(case 4). If the industrial sector was successfully restructured, then reforms of the agricultural 
sector might succeed (case 1) or not (case 2). In the remaining part of the paper both cases 
2 and 4 are commonly referred to as ‘inefficient’ cases and case 1 is our benchmark 
‘efficient’ outcome. When we discuss reform indices, we also indicate where p articular 
reforms have specific significance for given sectors.  
 
4. REFORMS AND STRUCTURES- ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
4.1 RESULTS OF SEPARATE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE THREE BASIC SECTORS 
As discussed already, shifts in the employment structures result from the adjustment process 
initiated by the implementation of market reforms. The efficiency of this adjustment, that is 
reaching a more ‘advanced’ structure of employment (in particular, no regressive increase in 
the share of agriculture in total employment), depends on the type and quality of the reforms 
implemented. The deindustrialisation process is less dramatic and painful if it is the result of 
reforms that help to maintain high productivity of both industry and agriculture sectors. A lag 
in reforms results in inefficiencies that cause lower levels of GDP, slower development of the 
service sector, a dramatic drop in industrial employment and even growth in agricultural 
sector employment. 
                                                                   
16 We focus on Central Eastern Europe, excluding China from consideration. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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To illustrate the accuracy of the theoretical model provide in Section 2  we search for 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the ‘quality’ of market reforms and structural 
characteristics of employment after the implementation of market reforms. The after-reform 
share of agriculture in total employment is expected to be negatively correlated with the 
quality of reforms. Similarly, we expect that the share of services is higher if reforms are 
successful. Moreover, we expect that the structural position of a (post-) transition economy 
is affected by the initial level of h uman and physical capital accumulation k (we use an initial 
GDP level per capita as a proxy and denote it ‘GDP 1989’ when reporting regression 
results). In addition, we use two additional control factors that are consistent with the 
literature (see discussion in Section 3). We include the variation in current levels of economic 
activity and foreign trade intensity. The potential influence of the current level of economic 
activity is captured by controlling for the (current) annual rate of change in investment (real 
fixed capital formation). We call this variable ‘Investment’. The share of foreign trade in 
GDP is denoted simply as ‘Foreign trade/GDP’. 
In our approach to the data, preference was given to quality not quantity. Therefore, instead 
of merging different sources, including secondary sources and national statistics, which are 
frequently not compatible, for the employment figures we use International Labour Office 
data, which is based on consistent methodology. This restricts us to a sample of thirteen 
transition economies, that is, all ten EU candidate countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe plus Croatia, Moldova and Russia. However, the choice of the ‘after-reform’ values 
is more problematic as the theoretical model refers to the after-transition steady state. It is 
obvious that the post-communist countries have not reached it yet, but since the reforms 
have been initiated in the early 1990s, it is clear by now whether the authorities have 
succeeded in the restructuring job, or not. To have the longest time span we could restrict 
ourselves to the latest available data, i.e., 1999. However, it would mean 12 data points for 
our regressions (data for Poland for 1999 was not available at the time of writing the paper). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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In the light of this we decided to include more years (1997-1999) and create a small panel 
of 38 observations.
17 
Another technical difficulty is that we need to measure the success of reforms implemented 
in countries in our sample. The theoretical model, for simplification purposes, strictly 
distinguishes between successful/unsuccessful industrial and agrarian reforms. In the real 
world, such a ‘zero-one’ classification is of course impossible. The ‘success of reforms’ 
variable is more continuous than discrete.
18 Moreover, it is hard to separate reforms, which 
have an effect on agriculture from reforms which impact on industry only. For instance, 
large-scale privatisation or corporate governance reforms are important for industry 
(dominated by larger firms) as well as agriculture (often characterised by collective farms). 
In general, we test whether reforms classified as more successful (corresponds to case 1) 
and less successful (combined cases 2 and 4) have different impact on the new structure of 
employment. To assess the quality of reforms we employ a widely used aggregate measure 
of reforms, constructed annually by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
19 We chose the EBRD transition indicators because they have clearly 
identified components, which provide greater scope for our analysis. However, we choose 
not to embark on a debate on the precision of transition indicators believing that any 
indicators of reforms face potential criticism since they are prone to subjective errors of 
judgement.  
All regression results are presented in the Appendix. From Table A1, it is apparent that the 
overall reforms indicator (denoted as ‘ Average TI’) has a big impact (as measured by 
                                                                   
17 Indeed we have run regressions for 12 observations only (i.e., corresponding to 1999). The results 
duplicate those presented in the paper. The results are readily available from the authors. 
18 Abviously from an econometric point of view it is better that the market reforms measure has a more 
‘continuous’ character. 
19 EBRD indicators relate to: large-scale privatisation, small-scale privatisation, governance and 
enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, 
banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. 
The scores are: 1, 1+, 2-, 2, 2+, 3-, 3, 3+, 4-, 4, 4+. Here, minuses were transformed into -0.333 and pluses 
into +0.333. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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standardised coefficient) on the post-transition share of agriculture in total employment. It is 
also statistically significant, in spite of the limited number of observations and all the controls 
included. Less successful reforms result in a larger post-reform agricultural sector, as 
predicted by the theoretical model. We note that the size of the agricultural sector is strongly 
and negatively affected by the initial level of GDP (our proxy for human and physical capital 
accumulated level k), again consistent with the theoretical model. It corresponds to the basic 
assumption that the higher income per capita, the lower the expected share of agriculture in 
employment. Neither, the current level of economic activity (rate of change in investment) 
nor the share of foreign trade in GDP is significant. 
As a further step, we check how important the particular components of reforms for this 
structural outcome are. To achieve this we replace the aggregate transition index (Average 
TI) by its three components. Those components are: ‘enterprise reform’, ‘markets and 
trade’ and ‘financial institutions’ denoted correspondingly as ‘Enterprises’, ‘Markets’ and 
‘Finance’. The results are presented in Table A2. 
Disaggregation of the reform measure significantly improves the overall results. Both 
adjusted R square and F statistics are higher. It is also clear that the importance of the 
particular reform components for the structural outcomes differ. The block of reforms 
described under the heading of ‘enterprise reform’ is most important, both in terms of the 
value of the standardised coefficient and the significance level. The two other elements of 
reforms are insignificant at a 5% level. The initial level of GDP retains significance, with the 
expected sign. 
Based on the significance of the ‘enterprise reforms’ coefficient we focus next on this group 
of reform indicators and decompose it  into second-level components, i.e. ‘large scale 
privatisation’, ‘small scale privatisation’ and ‘corporate governance’ reforms as explanatory 
variables. The modification of the model improves the overall fit even further (both adjusted 
R
2 and F -statistics). In fact, it is one of the two best models out of the twelve we present 
(A12 is the other). All the reform indicators are significant and with the expected signs. 
Thus, we may conclude that all the dimensions of the enterprise reforms are important in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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process of productivity improvement. Also, the significance of the initial level of GDP is 
robust to the change in specification. The share of foreign trade is now marginally significant. 
Overall, the strong link of both the reforms’ quality and the initial level of GDP per capita 
with the size of employment share of the agriculture sector in the ‘after-reform’ economies is 
clear. In particular, the robust relationship between the lower share of agricultural 
employment and successful enterprise reforms is  documented. We should stress that 
corporate governance and privatisation have a strong impact on restructuring both industry 
and agriculture. However, small privatisation relates stronger to reforms in agriculture than in 
industry. Thus, our results are consistent with the theoretical model. 
We should expect that results relating to services would match those described above for 
agriculture. Misdirected deindustrialisation leads to a higher share of agriculture in 
employment and therefore to a lower share of services. Thus, we should expect that the 
results related to services should mirror those presented in Tables A1-A3, but with the 
opposite sign. 
Indeed, Tables A4-A6 demonstrate that this is the case. The results relating to services 
correspond closely t o those for agriculture. From Table A4, we see that the overall 
transition index ( Average TI) is just marginally insignificant (at a 5% level), yet has the 
expected sign (i.e. positive). The initial level of GDP continues to have a significant impact. 
The next two tables, A5 and A6, demonstrate that the decomposition of reform indices 
improves the quality of the model significantly. Again, Model 2, presented in Table A5, 
highlights the significance of the ‘enterprise reform’ variable. When the latter variable is 
decomposed, Table A6, the variable related to small-scale privatisation is most significant. 
This indicator relates to progress in the privatisation of small-scale properties, including the 
subsequent tradability of ownership rights.  
The results presented confirm that there is a close correspondence between development of 
the agricultural and the service sector. The ‘efficient’ structural adjustment after transition is 
manifest in the increase of services in employment and decrease of agricultural employment. 
Wherever the creation of productive jobs in the service sector is inhibited, we find the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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harmful increase in the size of agricultural employment, once the process of downsizing in 
industry is brought about by transition. 
We now turn to the third broad sector of employment, i.e., industry. In the previous sections 
we have argued that it is the direction of deindustrialisation (i.e. either towards agriculture or 
towards services) not the absolute magnitude of changes in industry, which is a critical  
aggregate indicator of successful post-communist structural adjustment. Thus, we should not 
expect that the size of industry alone would correspond to unambiguous outcomes. Indeed, 
that is confirmed by the corresponding tests (Tables A7-A9). Again, we use three 
specifications, starting with the aggregate measure of reforms and subsequently adopting two 
levels of  decomposition. The results are weaker than for the other two sectors, yet the link 
between the share of industry in employment and reforms is significant and indicates that 
economies that were less successful in reforms experienced a more dramatic process of 
deindustrialisation (Table A7). After the decomposition, only the ‘enterprise reform’ 
component emerges as significant, with a positive sign. It confirms the previous results and 
strengthens the argument that successful reforms do not lead to a dramatic reduction of the 
industrial labour force. 
 
4.2 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: AGGREGATE STRUCTURAL INDICES 
So far, we have used separate specifications for the three basic sectors to investigate the link 
between successful transition programmes and structures of employment. However, the two 
alternative paths of structural adjustment (i.e. ‘efficient’ with large services and small 
agriculture and ‘inefficient’ with a small service sector and overgrown agriculture) may also 
be identified on a more disaggregated level, namely using ISIC-3 categories of employment. 
‘Efficient’ structural evolution will now be identified as convergence towards the 
employment structures of the developed market economies. Because of its weight, the size 
of the agricultural sector will still remain the dominant factor behind our measure, which 
makes it consistent both with the three-sector model postulated in Section 2 and with the 
separate sector specifications discussed in Section 4.1. However, the purpose of this William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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additional exercise is to investigate the use of an aggregate measure of structural similarities 
as an analytical device. 
We interpret ‘efficient’ transition as a convergence towards EU employment characteristics. 
The definition of the measure of distance between the employment structures of a transition 
country and of the comparator group, the ‘restructuring index’ (RI), is taken from Jackman 
and Pauna (1997). The RI i s defined as “a proportion of the workforce in each country 
which would need to change sector to enable the country to attain the same structure of 
employment as that of a comparable Western European economy” (Ibid., p.377).
20 Thus, 
the restructuring index  has a straightforward, intuitive interpretation. A lower value of the 
index corresponds to a more convergent structure. It is also worth stressing that, because 
the employment structures of comparator economies change over time, RI always measures 
the distance, not the absolute scale of required structural change. Formally, the RI for a 
given country X and a comparative structure Y is defined as: 
2
| | ￿ -
=
m
X
m
Y
m
X
S S
RI ,                         (15) 
where S relates to shares in employment of sector m. We consider now all ISIC-3 sectors, 
instead of our basis three-sector classification.
21 
Following Jackman and Pauna (1997), we use the average of four high-income northern EU 
economies (Germany, UK, Denmark and Netherlands) as the benchmark. The results of 
computations are presented in Table 2. 
                                                                   
20 As characterised by the Northern EU Group in the corresponding year. 
21 Jackman and Pauna (1997) do not provide a computational formula for their index, but it is easy to 
derive using their Table A. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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TABLE 2 
RESTRUCTURING INDICES (%): 1997- 1999 
Country  1997  1998  1999 
Bulgaria  31.9  31.9  31.3 
Croatia  21.5  19.3  20.3 
Czech R.  18.0  17.5  16.9 
Estonia  18.4  18.1  16.4 
Hungary  16.6  17.2  16.0 
Latvia  24.0  21.3  20.0 
Lithuania  21.7  21.6  22.7 
Moldova  42.3  45.9  49.3 
Poland  22.6  21.5  n.a. 
Romania  42.0  42.5  43.0 
Russia  21.4  21.7  22.2 
Slovakia  19.9  19.5  18.9 
Slovenia  24.1  23.6  21.2 
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1998-2000. 
 
Table 2 shows that the restructuring indices differ significantly among countries, e.g.,  16% 
for Hungary and as much as 49.3% for Moldova in 1999. A comparison of years 1997-99 
suggests a downward slopping trend of the RI for 9 out of 13 countries. However, countries 
like Romania, Russia, Moldova and, surprisingly, Lithuania manifest a divergence of the 
employment structures from the four EU comparators’ structures. 
 
We use the restructuring indices presented in Table 2 as the new dependent variables and 
repeat the regressions as described in Section 4.1. The results are presented in Tables A10-
A12. 
 
Table A10 shows that the EBRD’s measure of reform implementation remains a highly 
significant determinant of structural distance between the transition economies and  the 
comparator Northern EU economies. The initial level of GDP matters as well. Both 
variables have the expected signs. The trade intensity variable is not significant. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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Again, as the next step, we explore how the results change when we disaggregate our 
measure of reforms into three components. The results are presented in Table A11. Here, 
the initial level of GDP remains strongly significant and foreign trade intensity remains 
insignificant. However, as with the one-sector specifications of Section 4.1, the most 
interesting result relates to the differences between the three aspects of reforms. There is a 
dramatic disparity between the first cluster of reforms (‘enterprise reform’) and the two 
other clusters, which relate to market and price liberalisation, and the financial sector. The 
effect of the first cluster strongly dominates, which is reflected both in the value of its 
standardised coefficient and its significance level. 
 
As in the previous section, the cluster of ‘enterprise reform’ may be further disaggregated 
into the three components: ‘large scale privatisation’, ‘small scale privatisation’, and 
‘corporate governance’. The results are shown in Table A12. This time the explanatory 
power of the regression increases even further, in fact it is the best model in this respect. 
Both small privatisation and the quality of the corporate governance framework are highly 
significant, emphasising yet again the significance of agrarian reforms. This is because a slow 
process of privatisation in agriculture and/or constraints imposed on private property rights 
to land may result in lower productivity of agriculture. This in turn may have wider 
implications both for GDP levels and patterns of structural evolution. As hypothesised, the 
initial level of GDP remains  significant. The current activity control variable,  Investment, 
remains statistically irrelevant. The second control variable, foreign trade intensity, is now 
significant. One possible explanation for the latter result is that we now exclude the ‘markets 
reform’ indicator, highly correlated with trade intensity, from the regression. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Until the early 1990s deindustrialisation was seen as a trend characteristic of high-income 
countries only. However, the collapse of communism resulted in a significant reduction of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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share of industrial labour force in countries which at best are classified as middle-income. 
This development revives the discussion of the factors that determine the outcome of 
deindustrialisation. 
To answer the above question we diverse from the (already) classical literature on transition, 
which looks at the transition as a transfer between the old (state) and newly created 
(private) sector(s). We introduce three sectors (industry, agriculture and services) to the 
debate. Based o n the findings of Rowthorn and Wells (1987) we formalise a theoretical 
model of the long-run structural adjustment, taking sectoral productivities differentials as the 
driving force of structural changes. We link the high productivity of a sector with its 
successful restructuring. We conclude that there are two possible outcomes of structural 
transformation. An “efficient” outcome is one where the restructuring takes place in both the 
industrial and agricultural sectors, i.e. productivities of both sectors are high. In this case 
deindustrialisation is not dramatic. Moreover, the service sector grows and the agricultural 
sector decreases. A country following this path changes its employment structure towards 
those observed in developed countries. In contrast, a country which followed the 
“inefficient” path of structural adjustment (caused by low productivity of agriculture and/or 
industry as a result of badly implemented reforms) is characterised by the lower size of the 
service sector as compared with the “efficient” case (taking controlling factors into account). 
Deep deindustralisation and an increase in employment in the agriculture sector follow. Both 
of those theoretically defined structural development outcomes are observed in the post-
communist world. A n analysis of country statistics shows that the division of the post-
communist block into “efficient” and “inefficient” structural adjustment groups is justified. For 
instance, the Visegrad (Central European) countries follow the “efficient” path, whereas 
Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, and to smaller extent Bulgaria and Russia, give evidence 
of inefficient structural outcomes. The latter group, widely known for inconsistent 
implementation of market reforms, is characterised by a big slump of GDP, deep 
deindustralisation and a larger share of agriculture in the total employment. Regressions 
linking both the size of individual sectors and the aggregate restructuring index with different 
measures of structural reforms developed by EBRD show that the higher the  quality of 
reforms the deeper is the structural adjustment towards more efficient labour allocation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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From these regressions we also conclude that the EBRD “enterprise reform” cluster of 
indicators exhibits a high explanatory power. Corporate reforms and privatisation create the 
potential for microeconomic adjustment and that, in turn, induces the needed structural 
adjustment on a macro level. 
To summarise, we disagree with the naïve view of economic transition as a process of 
‘creative destruction’ (in particular in relation to an overgrown industrial sector) that should 
proceed as fast as possible. Deep deindustrialisation is not an indicator of the optimal path 
of transition. We argue that it is the direction, not the magnitude of change that matters. In 
particular, if dismantled industry is transformed into new ‘rust belts’, where former workers 
revert to survival-type agriculture, the outcome is obviously inefficient. We believe that our 
research highlights the importance of the link between reforms and m icro and macro 
restructuring and that the lessons can be extended beyond the group of ‘transition 
economies’. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 TABLE A1. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 1 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.797    6.218  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.031  -0.427  -2.914  0.007  0.658  1.520 
Investment  0.001  0.180  1.280  0.210  0.716  1.396 
F. Trade / GDP  -0.102  -0.155  -0.799  0.430  0.375  2.667 
Average TI  -0.142  -0.687  -3.170  0.003  0.301  3.326 
R square:0.563; adjusted R square: 0.478.     F statistics: 6.644, significance level: 0.000. 
  
TABLE A2. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 2 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  1.112    7.539  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.026  -0.359  -3.886  0.001  0.444  2.252 
Investment  0.000  0.004  0.045  0.964  0.596  1.677 
F. Trade / GDP  0.108  0.165  1.439  0.161  0.289  3.457 
Enterprises  -0.345  -1.103  -10.113  0.000  0.318  3.141 
Market  0.076  0.176  1.300  0.204  0.206  4.864 
Finance  0.015  0.066  0.493  0.625  0.214  4.682 
R square:0.890; adjusted R square: 0.860.     F statistics: 29.356, significance level: 0.000. 
 
Table A3. Determinants of Post-Transition Share of Agriculture in Employment: Model 3 
Collinearity Statistics  Variables   Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  1.399    15.026  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.031  -0.431  -5.717  0.000  0.634  1.578 
Investment  0.001  0.089  1.205  0.238  0.666  1.502 
F.Trade /GDP  0.173  0.263  2.469  0.020  0.317  3.151 
Large privat.  -0.089  -0.339  -3.947  0.000  0.488  2.050 
Small privat.  -0.166  -0.543  -5.698  0.000  0.396  2.525 
Governance  -0.077  -0.283  -2.325  0.027  0.243  4.111 
R square: 0.946; adjusted R square: 0.867.     F statistics:31.135 , significance level: 0.000. 
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TABLE A4. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 1 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.174    1.768  0.087     
GDP 1989  0.023  0.480  2.832  0.008  0.658  1.520 
Investment  -0.001  -0.108  -0.663  0.512  0.716  1.396 
F. Trade /GDP  0.039  0.089  0.397  0.694  0.375  2.667 
AverageTI  0.068  0.493  1.966  0.058  0.301  3.326 
R square:0.413; adjusted R square: 0.300.     F statistics: 3.641, significance level: 0.008. 
 
TABLE A5. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 2 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.109    0.771  0.447     
GDP 1989  0.017  0.350  2.631  0.013  0.444  2.252 
Investment  0.001  0.109  0.947  0.352  0.596  1.677 
F. Trade /GDP  -0.121  -0.277  -1.683  0.103  0.289  3.457 
Enterprises  0.224  1.081  6.883  0.000  0.318  3.141 
Market  -0.131  -0.454  -2.323  0.027  0.206  4.864 
Finance  0.013  0.088  0.460  0.649  0.214  4.682 
R square:0.772; Adjusted R square: 0.709.     F statistics: 12.292; significance level: 0.000 
 
Table A6. Determinants of Post-Transition Share of Services in Employment: Model 3 
Collinearity Statistics  Variables   Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  -0.262    -2.781  0.009     
GDP 1989  0.026  0.527  4.592  0.000  0.634  1.578 
Investment  -0.000  -0.049  -0.440  0.663  0.666  1.502 
F. Trade / GDP  -0.175  -0.400  -2.470  0.020  0.317  3.151 
Large privat.  0.047  0.272  2.082  0.046  0.488  2.050 
Small privat.  0.112  0.550  3.795  0.001  0.396  2.525 
Governance  0.048  0.269  1.452  0.157  0.243  4.111 
R square:0.758; adjusted R square: 0.692.    F statistics: 11.372, significance level: 0.000. 
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TABLE A7. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF INDUSTRY IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 1 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.029    0.364  0.718     
GDP 1989  0.008  0.197  1.171  0.250  0.658  1.520 
Investment  -0.001  -0.198  -1.225  0.230  0.716  1.396 
F. Trade /GDP  0.063  0.175  0.785  0.439  0.375  2.667 
Average TI  0.074  0.657  2.636  0.013  0.301  3.326 
R square:0.421; adjusted R square: 0.309.    F statistics: 3.753, significance level: 0.006. 
 
TABLE A8. DETERMINANTS OF POST-TRANSITION SHARE OF INDUSTRY IN EMPLOYMENT: MODEL 2 
Collinearity Statistics  Variables   Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  -0.220    -1.333  0.193     
GDP 1989  0.009  0.232  1.224  0.231  0.444  2.252 
Investment  -0.001  -0.138  -0.848  0.404  0.596  1.677 
F. Trade /GDP  0.013  0.035  0.150  0.882  0.289  3.457 
Enterprises  0.121  0.706  3.156  0.004  0.318  3.141 
Market  0.054  0.228  0.821  0.418  0.206  4.864 
Finance  -0.028  -0.227  -0.832  0.412  0.214  4.682 
R square:0.538; adjusted R square: 0.411.    F statistics: 4.229, significance level: 0.002 
 
Table A9. Determinants of Post-Transition Share of Industry in Employment: Model 3 
Collinearity Statistics  Variables   Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  -0.138    -1.260  0.218     
GDP 1989  0.006  0.148  0.919  0.366  0.634  1.578 
Investment  -0.000  -0.102  -0.648  0.522  0.666  1.502 
F. Trade /GDP  0.002  0.005  0.023  0.982  0.317  3.151 
Large privat.  0.041  0.289  1.572  0.127  0.488  2.050 
Small privat.  0.054  0.325  1.590  0.123  0.396  2.525 
Governance  0.028  0.191  0.732  0.470  0.243  4.111 
R square:0.521; adjusted R square: 0.389.    F statistics: 3.939, significance level: 0.003 
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TABLE A10. DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING INDEX: MODEL 1 
Collinearity Statistics  Variables   Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.737    7.650  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.024  -0.428  -2.954  0.006  0.658  1.520 
Investment  0.000  0.073  0.522  0.605  0.716  1.396 
F. Trade /GDP  -0.035  -0.070  -0.365  0.717  0.375  2.667 
Average TI  -0.120  -0.764  -3.560  0.001  0.301  3.326 
R square:0.571; adjusted R square: 0.488.    F statistics: 6.879, significance level: 0.000 
 
TABLE A11. DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING INDEX: MODEL 2 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  0.902    7.097  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.02  -0.355  -3.381  0.002  0.444  2.252 
Investment  -0.001  -0.110  -1.214  0.234  0.596  1.677 
F. Trade /GDP  0.131  0.263  2.021  0.053  0.289  3.457 
Enterprises  -0.246  -1.038  -8.384  0.000  0.318  3.141 
Market  0.080  0.244  1.580  0.125  0.206  4.864 
Finance  -0.022  -0.126  -0.831  0.413  0.214  4.682 
 R square:0.858; adjusted R square: 0.819     F statistics: 21.975, significance level: 0.000 
 
TABLE A12. DETERMINANTS OF RESTRUCTURING INDEX: MODEL 3 
Collinearity Statistics   Variables  Coefficients  Standardized 
Coefficients 
T  Significance 
Level  Tolerance  VIF 
(Constant)  1.182    18.872  0.000     
GDP 1989  -0.025  -0.447  -6.693  0.000  0.634  1.578 
Investment  0.000  0.031  0.472  0.640  0.666  1.502 
F. Trade /GDP  0.189  0.378  4.013  0.000  0.317  3.151 
Large privat.  -0.025  -0.127  -1.665  0.107  0.488  2.050 
Small privat.  -0.144  -0.619  -7.334  0.000  0.396  2.525 
Governance  -0.098  -0.474  -4.400  0.000  0.243  4.111 
R square:0.918; Adjusted R square: 0.896     F statistics: 40.651, significance level: 0.000 
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Notes on Tables: 
 
Number of observations: 38.  
Fixed year effects not reported.  
Data on shares of employment: ILO Yearbook, 1998-2000.  
Average TI: average of eight EBRD Transition Indicators, source: Transition Reports 1997-2000. 
GDP 1989: GDP per capita, source: UN Statistical Yearbook 1995 
Investment: annual change in real gross capital formation, computed on the basis of: UN Economic 
Survey of Europe, No. 2-3, 2000, p.161 
Foreign Trade/GDP: foreign trade in goods as % of GDP, source: World Bank (World Bank Atlas 
1999-2001, World Development Indicators 1998 
RI: restructuring index; authors’ computations based on ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1997-
2000. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 463 
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